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Abstract
Today, location-based applications and services such as friend finders and geo-social
networks are very popular. However, storing private position information on third-
party location servers leads to privacy problems. In our previous work, we proposed a
position sharing approach for secure management of positions on non-trusted servers
[1, 2], which distributes position shares of limited precision among servers of several
providers. In this paper, we propose two novel contributions to improve the original
approach. First, we optimize the placement of shares among servers by taking their
trustworthiness into account. Second, we optimize the location update protocols to
minimize the number of messages between mobile device and location servers.
Keywords: Location-based service, location privacy, obfuscation, position sharing,
map-awareness, location update, placement
1. Introduction
Driven by the availability of positioning systems such as GPS, powerful smartphones
such as the iPhone or Google Android phones, and cheap flat rates for mobile devices,
location-based services enjoy growing popularity. Advanced location-based applica-
tions (LBAs) such as friend finders or geo-social networks are typically based on lo-
cation server (LS) infrastructures that store mobile user positions to ensure scalability
by enabling the sharing of user positions between multiple applications. This principle
relieves the mobile device from sending position information to each LBA individually.
Instead, the mobile device updates the position at the LS, and LBAs query the LS for
the positions of mobile objects.
Although certainly useful from a technical point of view, storing data on LSs raises
privacy concerns if the LSs are non-trusted. Multiple incidents in the past have shown
that even if the provider of the LS is not misusing the data, private information can be
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revealed due to attacks, leaking, or loss of data [3, 4, 5]. Therefore, the assumption
of a trusted LS is questionable, and technical concepts are needed to ensure location
privacy without requiring a trusted third party (TTP).
Various location privacy approaches have been proposed in the literature. Many
approaches such as k-anonymity (e.g., [6]), rely on a TTP and are, therefore, not ap-
plicable to non-trusted environments. Approaches without the need for a TTP mainly
rely on the concept of spatial obfuscation, i.e., they reduce the precision of position
information stored on the LS. However, this severely impacts the quality of service of
LBAs since they can only be provided with coarse-grained positions, depending on the
degree of obfuscation.
To solve this conflict between privacy and quality of service, we have proposed the
concept of position sharing in our previous work [1, 2]. The basic idea of this concept
is to split up the precise user position into position shares of limited precision. These
shares are distributed among multiple LSs such that each LS has a limited, coarse-
grained view onto the user position. LBAs are provided with access rights to a certain
number of shares on different LSs. By using share fusion algorithms, a position of
higher precision can be calculated. Therefore, LBAs can be provided with different,
individual precision levels (privacy levels) although each LS only manage less precise
information. This approach does not require a TTP. Furthermore, it provides graceful
degradation of privacy, where no LS is a single point of failure with regard to privacy.
Instead, the precision of positions revealed to an attacker increases with the number of
compromised LSs.
The concept of position sharing can be applied to various settings and use cases.
For instance, it can be used to implement a secure personal data vault for location in-
formation of individual users over a non-trusted server infrastructure. The concept of
a personal data vault has been first proposed in [7]. A data vault is a data repository
controlled by the user for storing personal data and controlling the accessed to data
from different services. With the advent of cloud computing, it seems to be attractive
to implement data vaults atop cloud computing infrastructures, relieving the user from
operating her own dedicated servers. However, the providers of these cloud infras-
tructures might be non-trusted. Position sharing offers the possibility to avoid storing
all location data of the data vault at a single provider. Instead, the data vault can be
distributed among servers of different cloud providers, where each provider only has a
well-defined limited view onto the personal location information.
As another use case for position sharing, consider a startup company that wants to
provide location-based services to its customers. However, as typical for many startups,
the startup company does not own a dedicated server infrastructure but instead utilizes
an infrastructure as a service (IaaS) of a third-party IaaS provider. Assume that the
customer trusts the startup company to handle his private location information securely.
However, although the customer trusts the startup company, this does not imply that
the startup company trusts the IaaS provider operating the physical servers. Position
sharing enables the startup company to distribute its valuable private customer data
to several third-party IaaS providers to avoid a single point of failure and provide a
trustworthy virtual service to its customers over non-trusted IaaS infrastructures.
In this work, we present two novel contributions to extend the original position
sharing approach: (1) an algorithm for optimizing the placement of position shares on
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location servers of different trustworthiness; (2) optimized share update protocols that
significantly reduce the communication overhead of the original approach.
In our previous approach, we made the simplified assumption that every LS provider
is equally trustworthy, i.e., each LS has the same risk of being compromised. However,
a user might trust certain providers such as big companies with good reputation more
than others. Therefore, it seems reasonable that LSs of providers of higher trust levels
should store more precise information, i.e., either position shares of higher precision
or more shares. For instance, in the examples above IaaS providers operated by com-
panies like Google, Microsoft or Amazon might be considered more trustworthy than
servers of a cheaper but not so well-known IaaS providers. Still it might be reasonable
to utilize such cheaper providers for monetary reasons. With our extended position
sharing approach, we can balance the risk of revealing data by considering the individ-
ual trustworthiness of providers.
Therefore, the first contribution of this paper is an improved position sharing ap-
proach that takes individual trust levels of LS providers into account. To this end, we
optimize the placement of shares on LSs to increase the protection of privacy. We pro-
pose a suitable privacy metric and scalable share placement algorithms that (a) flexibly
select n of LSs, and (b) balance the risk among providers such that the risk of disclosing
private information stays below a user-defined threshold. Moreover, we aim to meet
the user-defined privacy requirements with a minimum number of LSs to minimize the
overhead of updating and querying several LSs.
Moreover, in our previous work we did not consider how multiple position updates
affect the communication overhead. This factor can negatively affect the scalability of
our approach, since each update includes n messages (where n is the number of LSs).
Therefore, as the second contribution of this paper, we propose a position update algo-
rithm which improves scalability by minimizing the number of transmitted messages
and does not change the user’s desired location privacy levels. This improvement is
achieved by omitting updates of shares that can remain unchanged after the given po-
sition change. Our evaluations show that the proposed method can save up to 60% of
messages compared to the previous version of this approach.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we give an overview
of the related work. In Section 3, we describe our system model and privacy metric.
In Section 4, we present the basic position sharing approach including the share fusion
and share generation algorithms. In Section 5, we propose a share placement algorithm
which distributes position shares among LSs depending on their individual trustwor-
thiness. Then in Section 6, we present position update algorithm which optimizes the
communication overhead caused by multiple position updates. Finally, in Section 7,
we conclude this paper with a summary.
2. Related Work
In this section, we will discuss existing approaches for location privacy. For a more in-
depth analysis and classification of location privacy techniques, we refer to our survey
paper [8].
A classic solution employed to preserve location privacy is cryptography. How-
ever, if user positions stored on servers are encrypted, server-side query processing of
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advanced queries such as range queries over the encrypted data becomes impossible,
or it is possible only at higher cost [9].
Another example of a cryptography-based approach for location privacy was pro-
posed by Mascetti et al. [10] to implement proximity services for geo-social networks.
The authors assume that service providers are non-trusted and consider the scenario
where mobile users want to notify their friends called buddies in their proximity. The
main idea is that the secret keys are shared with the selected buddies in a distributed
fashion and remain unknown to the service providers. The authors use a precision met-
ric which is defined through the union of multiple discrete space cells called granules.
A drawback of this approach is that it requires a complex implementation of the en-
cryption functionalities. Similarly to the work of Zhong et al. [11], this approach only
considers specific friend-finder and proximity calculation scenarios.
Another method to preserve location privacy is to send dummy positions to LBAs
together with the actual user position [12]. The problem with this approach is, however,
that dummy positions can be easily distinguished if the attacker has some background
information such as database of real user movements [13].
The idea of mix zones [14] is to select privacy-sensitive areas called mix zones in
which users do not send position updates while they are visible outside the mix zones.
Some extensions try to avoid the threat of analyzing possible user trajectories based
on the known entry and exit points on the borders of a mix zone [15]. The mix zones
approach lacks flexibility since it needs a pre-defined division of space into zones, and
does not allow for various privacy levels in different zones.
Many existing location privacy approaches are based on k-anonymity, e.g., [16].
The main idea is to send a set of k different positions of real mobile users (k-set)
to the LBA, such that the actual user position is indistinguishable from k − 1 other
positions. Many extensions of k-anonymity aim to make the k-set more robust to
various attacks—mostly against attacks based on the analysis of user attributes, e.g.,
[17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. However, in order to select a k-set, a trusted anonymizer with
global view is needed, which requires trust to a TTP, introducing a single point of
failure.
Obfuscation approaches such as [22] deliberately decrease the precision of user
positions stored on servers. A TTP is not required in this case since the cloaked region
can be generated by the user independently, but the queries over obfuscated locations
can result in imprecise or probabilistic answers. Our approach is also based on spatial
obfuscation, but it gracefully degrades position precision depending on the number
of missing position shares, and it supports multiple obfuscation levels (i.e., privacy
levels).
Marias et al. [23] propose to apply the concept of secret sharing [24] to position
information to distribute the information about single positions among several servers.
Their secret sharing approach relies on cryptographic techniques, which means that
all shares are required in order to retrieve a position. In order to overcome this draw-
back, we proposed the position sharing approach based on spatial obfuscation [1],
map-aware spatial obfuscation [2], and cryptographic multi-secret sharing techniques
(PShare) [25]. However, in all these works, LSs are assumed to be equally trustwor-
thy, and, therefore, each LS stores one position share of equal precision. In this paper,
we will show that optimized share placement based on the individual trust levels of
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Figure 1: System model
providers significantly increases privacy if providers are of different trustworthiness
and opens up the possibility to minimize the number of required LSs. Moreover, we
will extend our previous work by introducing an optimized location update algorithm,
which reduces the number of transmitted messages to the LSs.
3. System Model and Privacy Metric
This section introduces our conceptual system model, operational system model and
privacy metrics of the position sharing approach.
3.1. System Model
Our system model is shown in Figure 1. It consists of four components: mobile objects,
location servers, location-based applications, and a trust database.
The user is represented by the mobile object (MO), which knows its precise position
pi, for instance, determined through GPS. A position of certain precision is defined by
a circular area which we call obfuscation area, where radius r of this circular area
defines the precision prec(pi) = φ = r of position pi. A smaller radius corresponds to
a higher precision: if r1 = prec(pi1), r2 = prec(pi2) and r1 < r2, then the precision of
pi1 is higher than the precision of pi2.
The MO executes a local component to perform the generation of position shares on
the mobile device. We assume that this component can be implemented in a trustworthy
way, e.g., by using a Trusted Computing Platform [26]. The MO generates one master
share s0 with the minimal acceptable precision φmin chosen such that there are no
problems with regard to privacy, and a set of n refinement shares S = {s1, . . . , sn}:
generate(pi, n, φmin) = {s0, S} (1)
Given a subset S′ ⊆ S of refinement shares, its fusion with s0 (which is known to
everyone) results in a position pi′ of a certain well-defined precision:
fuse(s0, S
′) = pi′, (2)
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Figure 2: (a) Distributed Location Data Vault scenario; (b) Virtual location-based service provider scenario
with prec(pi) < prec(pi′), i.e., φ ≤ φ′
The fusion of s0 with the set S of all refinement shares obtained from the LSs provides
the exact position pi of precision φmax.
We say that shares are heterogeneous if each share si increases the position preci-
sion by an individual amount ∆φi . Typically, for heterogeneous shares, share fusion has
to be performed in a certain fixed order, in contrast to homogeneous shares that can be
fused in any order. If a share generation algorithm produces homogeneous shares, only
the number of different shares defines the resulting precision level φk. In this case, the
precision increase is equal for each share: ∆φ1 = ∆
φ
2 = . . . = ∆
φ
n = φmax/n.
A location server (LS) stores and delivers location data of users to LBAs. Each
LS has a standard authentication mechanism, which allows to specify access rights for
the LBAs (given by a user) to access shares stored by this LS. The maximal allowed
precision of a user position is defined individually depending on the concrete LBA by
specifying a certain set of LSs accessible for each LBA.
We assume that each provider operates one LS. Internally, this LS can be imple-
mented by a number of physical servers, e.g., running in a data center. Also, an LS can
be implemented based on the “virtual provider” model on top of an Infrastructure-as-
a-Service (IaaS). For instance, to implement a cloud-based personal Data Vault storing
and filtering locations of individual users as already motivated in Section 1, each LS
could be implemented atop a virtual machine operated by an individual IaaS provider
as depicted in Figure 2a. The set of LS then implements the distributed personal Data
Vault offering a well-defined interface to LBAs. The LBAs need to be aware of the in-
terface of the distributed Data Vault in order to query data from the Data Vault, which
is a typical assumption of the Data Vault concept.
Another operational model is the implementation of a virtual LBA offered by a
startup company (LBA provider) not owning a dedicated server infrastructure as moti-
vated in Section 1. Here, we assume that the customer actually trusts the LBA provider,
however, the LBA provider does not trust the IaaS providers operating the virtual ma-
chines running the LS as depicted in Figure 2b. Although in this setting there is only
a single LBA which is trustworthy from the point of view of the mobile object (cus-
tomer) and thus can be provided with position information of maximum precision, the
position sharing concept is still useful since it allows the trusted LBA provider to im-
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plement its service atop a non-trusted IaaS infrastructure to manage positions of the
whole population of all customers. The LBA logic is implemented by a trusted app
running on the mobile device, so the non-trusted IaaS providers cannot influence how
data is distributed among LS.
Since the Data Vault scenario is the more general case with several non-trusted
LBAs, which should be provided with location information of different precision, we
will further on focus on this scenario only.
Each LS is non-trusted and can be compromised with probability pi. Risk value pi
represents the probability of LSi to behave maliciously, i.e., to misuse the user’s pri-
vate position information, or to be compromised by an external attacker. The concrete
concepts for calculating pi are beyond the scope of this paper. For instance, we can
use the generic probabilistic trust model described in [27]. This model is generic in the
sense that it allows mapping of various representations of trust values to the probabilis-
tic interval [0; 1]. Different LSs might have different risks depending, for instance, on
the reputation of their provider. Moreover, different users might have individual trust
in the same LS (and/or its provider).
The trust database manages the trust in different LSs by providing the probabilities
pi that LSi can be compromised. Based on the obtained risk values, the user can
determine the number and set of LSs needed to satisfy his security requirements, as we
will show in the following sections. We assume that the trust database is given, and
it is filled with data, for example, by analyzing the feedback of other users through a
reputation system [28, 29].
Location-based applications (LBAs) query or track MO’s position and obtain mul-
tiple shares from different LSs depending on the access rights given by user. Then, the
LBA fuses the obtained shares by using function fuse(...) (Equation 2) in order to get
the user position with a certain level of precision.
3.2. Privacy Metric
The user’s privacy levels are primarily defined through precision levels φk, which are
pre-defined by the user for each 0 ≤ k ≤ n as radii rk of a circular obfuscation
areas. Additionally, we use a probabilistic privacy metric since the precision of a po-
sition obtained by an attacker depends on the probabilities of compromising LSs as
well as on the ability of an attacker to derive higher position precisions by analyz-
ing the obtained shares (as shown in [1, 2]). The following distribution Pk,attack de-
fines the probability of an attacker obtaining a position pik,attack of a certain precision
φk,attack = prec(pik,attack) depending on the number k of compromised LSs:
Pk,attack(φk) = Pr[φk,attack ≤ φk] (3)
This metric can be used by the MO to define the acceptable probabilistic guarantees
represented as a set of probability thresholds Pk(φk) corresponding to various preci-
sion levels φk. For example, an MO can specify that an attacker must not be able to
obtain a position of precision φ1 ≤ 1 km with probability P1,attack > 0.2, and φ2 ≤ 2
km with P2,attack > 0.1, etc.
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Figure 3: Basic position sharing approach: after getting each new share (i.e., a shift vector plus a radius
decrease), the precision is increased until we get the exact target position pi
4. Basic Position Sharing Approach
In this section, we will present the basic principle and two basic versions of the position
sharing approach: (a) for open space models (with no map knowledge) and (b) for
spatial constrains (taking into account map knowledge as explained later). Each of
them includes an algorithm for LBAs to fuse position shares, and an algorithm for
MOs to generate the shares.
4.1. Position Sharing: Basic Principle
In general, our position sharing approach is based on geometric transformations, where
imprecise geometric positions are defined by circular areas ci with radii ri [1, 2]. Each
share is a vector shifting the center of the current obfuscated position represented as a
circle, whose radius is decreased after every shift. An example of precision increase
through such share fusion is shown in Figure 3. The share defines the precision increase
∆φi after the corresponding ith shift of the center of the circle and the radius decrease.
After generating the shares, the MO distributes them among multiple LSs and up-
dates them continuously. The master share is publicly available to anyone. In order to
control the access to refinement shares, the MO defines access rights to a certain subset
of shares for each individual LBA.
The concrete share generation and share fusion algorithms depend on whether we
consider the availability of map knowledge or not. Next, we first assume that no map
knowledge is available before we present an extended approach taking map knowledge
into account.
4.2. Open Space Position Sharing (OSPS)
In [1], we presented the position sharing approach for open space, referred to as OSPS
(Open Space Position Sharing). The open space model weakens the attacker model by
assuming that no map is known to an adversary. In other words, we assume a uniform
probability distribution of MO positions.
The share fusion algorithm is executed on the LBA, which knows the number of LS
providers resp. the total number of refinement shares n, the obtained refinement shares
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Algorithm 1 OSPS: fusion of shares
1: function fuse k shares OSPS(n, s0, ~s1 . . . ~sk)
2: ∆r ← r0/n; ~p← ~p0; r ← r0
3: for i = 1 to k do
4: ~p← ~p+ ~si;
5: r ← r −∆r
6: return ck = {~p, r}
Figure 4: OSPS: same set of shares fused in an arbitrary order (n = 4, k = 3, r0 = 20 km, ∆r = 5 km)
~s1 . . . ~sk (k < n), and the master share s0. We define the master share as the obfusca-
tion circle c0 with center p0 and precision φ defined through radius r0.
The refinement shares are shift vectors S = {~s1 . . . ~sn}. The ith share defines
the precision increase ∆φi after shifting the corresponding ith circle and decreasing its
radius.
The share fusion algorithm of OSPS is shown in Algorithm 1 (cf. Figure 4). Start-
ing from the initial obfuscation circle c0 (lines 2,5), step-by-step for k shares (line 3)
each vector ~si shifts the center pi of the current obfuscation circle ci (line 4) while
reducing the radius ri (line 5) of the current obfuscation circle by a pre-defined value
∆r = r0/n = ∆
φ
i (line 2). Note that in OSPS, ∆
φ
i has the same value ∆φ for each i.
The resulting obfuscation circle is ck (line 6).
In Figure 4, we show an example of share fusion for n = 4, k = 3, r0 = 20 km,
∆r = 5 km. As shown, the order of fusing the refinement shares can be arbitrary,
while the precision (radius) of every obfuscation circle ck is well defined. Note that
our algorithm is not dependent on the absolute values of r0 and ∆r, i.e., it works for
any selected size of r0.
The generation of shares in OSPS is presented in Algorithm 2: The input parame-
ters are the user-defined radius r0 of the initial obfuscation circle c0, the total number
of shares n, and the precise user position pi = pn. First, we determine the maximum
shift length ∆r = ∆φ = r0/n (line 2). In the second step, position p0 of the initial
circle c0 is selected randomly according to a uniform distribution such that pi = pn is
inside c0 (line 3). The set of the refinement shift vectors S = {~s1 . . . ~sn−1} is gener-
ated with random direction and length (lines 4-6), starting from the center of c0. All
shift vectors of S are concatenated such that the resulting point pi = pn (with rn = 0
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Algorithm 2 OSPS: generation of shares
1: function generate n shares OSPS(s0, n, pi)
2: ∆r ← r0/n
3: select randomly p0 such that distance( ~p0, pi) ≤ r0
4: do
5: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
6: select rand. ~si with |~si| ≤ ∆r such that pi ∈ ci
7: while distance( ~p0 +
∑n−1
i=1 ~si, pi) > ∆r
8: ~sn ← pi − ( ~p0 +∑n−1i=1 ~si)
9: return ~s0 . . . ~sn
Figure 5: CSPS: a) intersection of 3 circles c0, c1, c2 and the map representationMu (yellow); b) adjustment
of intersection area through radius increase for c1: A1 = area(Mu ∩ c0 ∩ c1) = area(c‘1)
correspondingly) coincides with the user’s position pi within c0 (line 8). The vector
lengths are selected from the interval [0; ∆r] uniformly at random. Finally, MO sends
the position information to n LSs, including the master share s0, the radius decrease
after every shift ∆r (in OSPS, ∆r is constant for all shifts), and one share ~si for each
LS. The master share is stored on every LS, while each LS stores only one refinement
share.
4.3. Constrained Space Position Sharing (CSPS)
The obvious limitation of OSPS is that it is not applicable for constrained space models.
If an attacker has map knowledge, the attacker is able to reduce the size of the generated
obfuscation areas. By excluding areas where the user cannot be located such as water
surfaces, ravines, and agriculture fields, it is possible for the attacker to intersect an
obfuscation circle ck with areas such as roads, squares, buildings, etc. Since the total
area of possible user locations in ck is smaller than the total area of ck, the target
privacy guarantees—based on the size of obfuscation circles, i.e., precision—are not
preserved. To resolve these problems, we present an improved version of the position
sharing approach next, which was first introduced in [2].
In the map-aware position sharing approach for constrained space (CSPS), we in-
troduce the binary map representation Mu (cf. Figure 5a; Mu shown in yellow). Each
location is marked by “true” if the MO can be possibly located there, or “false” if it
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is impossible that MO is located in this area. We define the obfuscation area Ak for k
shares of precision φk through the intersection of k circles c1 . . . ck, and Mu:
Ak = area(Mu ∩ c0 ∩ c1 ∩ . . . ∩ ck) = pi ∗ r2k (4)
Before share generation, the user has to select a map representation Mu, which defines
the map regions where the user can possibly be located. Mu is individual for each user,
since different users can be possibly located in different map regions.
The share fusion algorithm of CSPS is shown in Algorithm 3 (cf. Figure 5a). It
is similar to the OSPS share fusion (Algorithm 1). The main difference is that c0 as
well as each ci are intersected with the map representation Mu (lines 2, 7). Note that
the radii are not pre-defined as in OSPS, but each obfuscation has its individual radius
defined by the map-aware share generation algorithm.
Algorithm 3 CSPS: fusion of shares
1: function fuse k shares CSPS(Mu, n, c0, ~s1 . . . ~sk, r1 . . . rk)
2: Ak ←Mu ∩ c0
3: ~p← ~p0
4: for i = 1 to k do
5: ~p← ~p+ ~si
6: ci ← {~p, ri}
7: Ak ← Ak ∩ ci
8: end for
9: return Ak
Our goal is to preserve the required privacy level by providing an obfuscation area
of a given size. To this end, we adapt the radius such that the intersection area of Mu
and obfuscation circles c0 . . . ck is not smaller than this size.
Algorithm 4 shows the CSPS share generation algorithm with map knowledge (cf.
Figure 5b). In Algorithm 4, the radius rk is increased until the area of Mu ∩ (c0 ∩
c1 ∩ . . . ∩ ck) is equal or greater than the value of the non-intersected area of ck. By
applying this condition, we ensure that the precision difference between areas A − k
and Ak+1 corresponds to the required ∆φ.
In lines 4-6, the radius r0 of the initial circle c0 is increased considering the map
representation Mu, in order to adjust the size of A0 = Mu ∩ c0. Also, to adjust the
radii of shares ~s1 . . . ~sn−1, Mu is included in the condition, which defines the target
area size (lines 11-13). The remaining steps of the share generation algorithm for CSPS
are similar to Algorithm 2.
If we used a deterministic algorithm for the area adjustment (lines 5, 12), an at-
tacker could calculate the inverse function to decrease the size of the obfuscation area.
Therefore, the resulting center of circle ci must be randomly shifted together with the
radius increase, so that its original center c′i cannot be determined (cf. Figure 6a).
Algorithm 5 shows the increase(...) function for increasing ri together with shift-
ing the center pi (cf. Figure 6b). First, for the given pi we increase the radius ri until
its value provides the required size of the obfuscation area (lines 4-6). Then pi is ran-
domly shifted, such that the shift is not greater than ri − r′i (lines 7-9). Next, we check
again whether the current radius ri still provides the required size of intersection area
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Algorithm 4 CSPS: generation of shares
1: function gen n shares CSPS(n,Mu, r0, pi)
2: select randomly p0 with distance(p0, pi) ≤ r0
3: A0 ← area(c0)
4: while area(Mu ∩ c0) < A0 do
5: r0 ← increase(r0, p0,∆r)
6: end while
7: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
8: ri ← r0 ∗ (n− i)/n
9: select rnd. ~si with |~si| ≤ 2 ∗ ri−1 and pi ∈ ci
10: Ai ← area(ci)
11: while area(Mu ∩ ∩ij=1(cj)) < Ai do
12: ri ← increase(ri, pi,∆r)
13: end while
14: end for
15: ~sn ← pi − ( ~p0 +∑n−1i=1 ~si)
16: return ~s0 . . . ~sn, r0 . . . rn
Figure 6: Adjustment of pi during radius increase: (a) no adjustment of pi; (b) randomized adjustment of pi
(line 10). If this area is not large enough, we call the function increase(ri, . . .) recur-
sively (line 11). If the intersection area now exceeds the target value Ai, we decrease
the current radius ri until the intersection area hits its limit (lines 12-16).
In Figure 6b, we show that after the adjustment of pi, the target position pi can be
located anywhere within ci; it is not restricted to the obfuscation area which corre-
sponds to the smaller radius r′i. Thus, it is not possible for an attacker to reduce the
obfuscation area Ai knowing the share generation algorithm and r′i.
5. Optimization of Share Placement
So far, we assumed that all servers are equally trustworthy. Now, we consider the
case when servers have various trust levels. Since each LS has an individual trust
value, the user’s position privacy highly depends on the number of selected LSs and
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Algorithm 5 Radius increase with adjustment of pi
1: function increase(ri, pi,∆r)
2: r′i ← ri
3: Ai ← area(c′i)
4: while area(∩ij=1(cj)) < Ai do
5: ri ← ri + ∆r
6: end while
7: xshift ← get random shift(pi, r′i, ri)
8: yshift ← get random shift(pi, r′i, ri)
9: pi ← shift(pi, xshift, yshift)
10: if area(∩ij=1(cj)) < Ai then
11: ri ← increase(ri, pi,∆r)
12: else
13: while area(∩ij=1(cj)) > Ai do
14: ri ← ri −∆r
15: end while
16: ri ← ri + ∆r
17: end if
18: return pi, ri
the placement of shares on different LSs. In our previous work [1, 2], we used an equal
share placement strategy, i.e., each LS stored shares of the same precision increase
∆φ = ∆
φ
i . Now, we want to make sure that an LS with a higher trust level can
store more precise position information than an LS that has a higher risk of being
compromised.
5.1. Problem Statement: Share Placement under Individual Trust Levels
The problem of share placement on LSs with individual trust levels can be defined as
a constrained optimization problem. The constraint is that an attacker cannot derive a
position pik,attack = fuse(s0, Sk) of precision prec(pik,attack) > φk with a probability
higher than Pk(φk), where Sk denotes the set of compromised refinement shares. That
is, the user defines probabilistic guarantees Pk for different precision levels φk.
The optimization goal is to provide the specified privacy levels and their proba-
bilistic guarantees by minimizing the number of LSs. By minimizing the number of
required LSs, we limit the induced overhead of updating (communicating) and storing
shares at multiple servers.
We assume the following values to be given:
• master share s0,
• set S of n refinement shares {s1, . . . , sn} to provide the precision (privacy) lev-
els φk for the LBAs,
• candidate setL ofm0 available LSs, which can store sharesL = {LS1, . . . ,LSm0},
• set of risk values {p1, . . . , pm0} providing the probabilities for each LSi of L to
be compromised (pi ∈ [0; 1]),
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• probability distribution Pk(φk) specifying the required probabilistic guarantees
Pk for each precision (privacy) level φk.
Problem: Find a share placement place(. . .) of n shares to a set L′ ≤ L of LSs:
place({s1, . . . , sn}, L) : S → L′ ⊆ L, (5)
such that |L′| is minimal, and the user’s security requirements are fulfilled:
∀ φk,attack : Pk(φk) > Pr[φk,attack ≤ φk] (6)
5.2. General Selection & Placement Algorithm
In our work, we made two assumptions. The first assumption is that increasing the
number m of LSs leads to higher security with regard to probabilistic guarantees of
privacy levels. At the same time, a large m is not desired, since it would increase stor-
age and communication overhead. Therefore, it is beneficial to incrementally increase
m only until the security requirements are fulfilled. The second assumption is that we
can increase security by optimizing the distribution of shares for a given m. For the
validation of both assumptions, we refer to our work [30].
The algorithm for optimal share placement (Algorithm 6) consists of two major
steps: (a) selection of a minimum number m = |L′| of location servers L′ = LS1,
LS2, ..., LSm required to fulfill the given privacy constraint; (b) optimization of the
placement n shares among these m LSs.
The basic idea is to start with the smallest set of LSs and incrementally increase m
(lines 2 and 7) until the security constraints (Equation 6) are fulfilled. In each step, we
greedily add the next most trusted LS to set L′, since the subset of the most trusted LSs
provides the highest security. Therefore, the available LSs must be initially sorted by
ascending risks pi (line 3).
For each number of LSs, we first check whether a uniform placement (line 8) where
each LS stores an equal number of shares, independent of its individual risk value,
fulfills the user-defined probabilistic guarantees of privacy levels (lines 9-11). If the
non-optimized solution (i.e., uniform placement) already represents a solution with
regard to the constraint, we skip the optimization algorithm to save energy resources of
the mobile device, which executes this algorithm.
If the uniform (non-optimized) share placement on LSs does not satisfy the user’s
privacy requirements, we optimize the placement by relocating shares from less trusted
to more trusted LSs (line 12). The share placement algorithm invoked in line 12 in the
major contribution of this section, and will be presented in detail in Section 5.3.
If m reaches the total number of available LSs m0, but no solution has been found,
the given security requirements are too hard. Therefore, the user should relax the con-
straints (probabilistic guarantees of privacy levels) given in Equation 6 step by step,
and execute the algorithm again.
In lines 9 and 13 of Algorithm 6, we determine the probabilistic guarantees of
privacy levels of a placement. We calculate Pk,attack for different numbers kattack of
compromised LSs for a given placement as follows:
Pk,attack =
m∑
k=kattack
(mk )∑
i=0
pi,incl · pi,excl, (7)
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Algorithm 6 General Selection & Placement Algorithm
1: function place(Pk(φk), S, L,m0,mmin, n)
2: m← mmin − 1
3: sort by ascending pi(L)
4: L′ ← get selected set(L,m)
5: solution found← false
6: repeat
7: m← m+ 1
8: distribute equal(Pk(φk), S, L
′,m)
9: if ∀ φk : Pk < Pk,attack(φk) then
10: solution found← true
11: else
12: place optimized(S,L′,m)
13: if ∀ φk : Pk < Pk,attack(φk) then
14: solution found← true
15: end if
16: end if
17: until (m = m0)||(solution found)
18: return S → L′
pi,incl =
m∏
j=0
pj ,∀pj ∈ Pk,i (8)
pi,excl =
m∏
j=0
(1− pj),∀pj /∈ Pk,i, (9)
where Pk,i is the set of risks of the ith k-combination out of m LS risks.
There are
(
m
k
)
combinations of LS to compromise exactly k LSs. Each combina-
tion has the probability defined by multiplying the risks pj of (included) k LSs and the
inverse risks 1 − pj of the rest (excluded) m − k LSs. To get a probability of exactly
k compromised LSs, we have to sum up the probability of each k-combination. Fi-
nally, to get a probability of at least k compromised LSs, we sum up the probabilities
corresponding to {k, k + 1, ...,m} compromised LSs.
5.3. Optimized Share Placement Algorithm
In this section, we present an algorithm to solve the optimized share placement prob-
lem, which is called from Algorithm 6 through function place optimized(. . .). Here,
we consider the situation when a set L′ of m = |L′| LSs with lowest risks has been
selected and is fixed. Thus, an optimized placement of n shares to these LSs in L′
must be found, after the uniform placement strategy did not satisfy the user’s security
constraints. First, we show that this problem is NP-hard. Then, we propose a heuristic
solution based on a genetic algorithm.
We selected a strategy that minimizes the risk of revealing the positions of high
precision by applying the principle of risk balancing. This principle is well-known
from risk-based capital allocation and is commonly applied if the risk values are avail-
able, and there are no correlations between them [31, 32], as is the case in our system
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model, where we do not know any relations between different LS providers. We call
this placement problem the Balanced Risk Placement Problem (BRPP).
Formally, a share placement S → L′ ⊆ L has balanced risk if the proportion of
position precisions φi1,j and φi2,j stored by LSi1 and LSi2 respectively (j = 1 . . . n) is
inversely proportional to the corresponding risks pi1 and pi2 of LSi1 and LSi2:
S → L′ ⊆ L : ∀ i1, i2 ∈ m, j ∈ n :
∑n
j=1 ∆φi2,j∑n
j=1 ∆φi1,j
=
pi1
pi2
(10)
If the exact equality of proportions is not feasible due to the given risk values and other
parameters, the goal is to find a share placement solution which is close to the best
possible solution:
minimize maxmi=1
n∑
j=1
pi∆φi,j −minmi=1
n∑
j=1
pi∆φi,j , (11)
under the restrictions of probabilistic guarantees of precision levels given in Equation 6.
This problem defines how the function place optimized(. . .) of Algorithm 6 must be
implemented.
BRPP is NP-hard, which can be shown by reducing the Agent Bottleneck General
Assignment Problem (ABGAP), which is known to be NP-hard [33, 34], to BRPP.
ABGAP is defined as:
minimize maxmi=1
n∑
j=1
pi∆φi,j (12)
ABGAP is equivalent to our placement problem, since one can be polynomially trans-
formed into another: If we simplify our problem by adding an LS with 0 risk, we
can exclude the second term from Equation 11. This means that in order to solve our
problem, we must also solve ABGAP. Thus, our problem is at least NP-Hard.
The total number of possible placement combinations for distributing n shares
among m LSs is O(mn). Since this number grows exponentially with the number
of shares, an exhaustive search is very costly for larger m and n. Even relatively small
numbers such asm = 5 and n = 15 require the analysis of more than 3∗1010 combina-
tions. To reduce the computational complexity, we implement a linear-time heuristic.
Our goal is not to find the best placement among all possible combinations, but to find
a placement which satisfies the required probabilistic guarantees. To this end, we need
a strategy that guides our search for a secure placement in a reasonable (linear) time.
In general, problem-specific heuristics or meta-heuristics can be used to find heuris-
tic solution. We applied the meta-heuristic of genetic algorithms [35]. Genetic algo-
rithms reproduce the process of biological evolution. They work on multiple solution
candidates by combining and mutating them into new possible solutions. Each new so-
lution (in our case, a share placement) is rated according to a fitness (objective) function
defined by Equation 11. Then, the best placements in terms of the objective functions
are selected, and the cycle can repeat until the goal is reached or the limit of cycles is
achieved.
We implemented a genetic algorithm for share placement as shown in Algorithm 7.
The input parameters are the probabilities Pk(φk), the set L of sizem, and the fixed set
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Algorithm 7 Genetic Algorithm for Share Placement
1: function place optimized(S,L′,m)
2: t← 0
3: Popul[1 . . . 10]← RandomPlacement(S,L′,m)
4: while t < 200 and ∀ Pk < Pk,attack do
5: for p = 1 to 40 do
6: i1 ← RandomInteger(m); i2 ← RandomInteger(m)
7: u← RandomBoolean()
8: if u then
9: PopulTemp[p]← Cross(PopulTemp, i1, i2)
10: end if
11: PopulTemp[p]← Mutate(PopulTemp[p])
12: end for
13: Evaluate(PopulTemp)
14: Popul← Select10Best(PopulTemp)
15: Pattack(φ)← BestLevels(Popul)
16: t← t+ 1
17: end while
of shares S of size n. First, we define the initial population as 10 random placements
(line 3). Then, we build a population of 40 new placements by recombining two place-
ments with a uniform crossover (with a probability of 50%) (lines 5-10). Afterwards,
the placement is mutated by changing one assignment randomly (line 11), ensuring
that theoretically all possible placements could be created.
Next, the 40 created placements are rated according to the objective function, and
10 best placements are selected (lines 13-14). This cycle is iterated 200 times or
stopped if the conditions of Equation 11 are satisfied (lines 4-17). The value of 200
iterations is selected such that it ensures convergence. Our experiments have shown
that we already achieve a near-optimal placement solution after about 20 iterations. If
after all cycles the probabilistic guaranties are still not satisfied (line 4), we say that the
solution cannot be found for the given input parameters.
6. Optimization of Position Update Algorithm
Our basic approach [1, 2] described in Section 3, allows for sharing user’s position
among multiple non-trusted LSs, but for the price of increased communication over-
head. A complete set of shares has to be re-generated and sent to the corresponding
set of LSs every time a position update event is triggered. More precisely, an MO
must send n messages with new position shares to n different LSs, while an LBA must
receive k messages from k LSs in order to obtain the position of the kth precision
level. This principle can produce a high communication overhead, e.g., if the update
rate is high and the number of LSs is large. However, in many cases such as sporadic
movements of the MO, the re-generation and update of the whole share set causes re-
dundancy. Hence, our goal is to send a smaller number of messages than n after each
position change.
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In this section, we begin by defining the problem of message reduction. Then, we
describe an optimized position update algorithm for position sharing approach.
6.1. Problem Statement: Minimization of Position Update Messages
We formulate the reduction of position updates as a constrained optimization problem.
The optimization goal is to reduce the total number of position update messages
being sent from MOs to LSs (denoted as the number of messages NMO−LS). The
constraints are that there should be no change of position precision φk as a result, as
well as no reduction of the user’s probabilistic guarantees Pk,attack(φk) of precision
(privacy) levels.
We assume the following values to be given:
• n location servers,
• the MO’s previous consecutive precise position pii, i.e., the position before pii+1
(the algorithm is run on the MO side, which means that the MO’s own precise
positions are available),
• the MO’s next consecutive precise position pii+1, i.e., the position after pii,
• master share s0 generated for pii,
• set Si of n refinement shares s1 . . . sn generated for pii,
• probability distribution Pk(φk), which specifies the required probabilistic guar-
antees for each precision level φk.
Problem: Find the set of shares Si+1opt such that S
i+1
opt requires the minimal number
of update messages from MOs to LSs. In other words, Si+1 (Si+1 = Si+1opt ) and S
i
should differ in as few shares as possible, i.e., in Si+1 as many shares as possible
should be reused from Si.
The concatenation of all shift vectors of Si+1opt must point to pii+1:
Si+1opt = {si+10 . . . si+1n } :
n∑
k=0
si+1k = pii+1, (13)
The precision φk of each imprecise position pi+1k derived by share fusion after ob-
taining the minimized set Si+1opt has to be the same as the precision of the corresponding
imprecise position pik derived from the original set of shares S
i:
∀Si+1k ∈ Si+1opt , Sik ∈ Si : φk(pi+1k (Si+1k )) = φk(pik(Sik)) (14)
Finally, the set of shares Si+1opt must also satisfy the current user’s privacy require-
ments, i.e., each further kth share must provide the pre-defined probability Pk(φk):
∀ φk,attack : Pk(φk) > Pr[φk,attack ≤ φk]; (15)
Note that we do not assume that an MO’s complete trajectory is available. We
consider only the neighboring consecutive position updates. Hence, we cannot apply
statistical analysis of the past positions and the respective parameters such as speed, and
therefore we do not consider approaches for preserving privacy of a complete trajectory.
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Figure 7: Large movement of MO; two consecutive master shares do not intersect
6.2. Optimized Position Update Algorithm
Depending on the movement scenario, different position update approaches can be
beneficial.
The key factor which separates sporadic and continuous update scenarios is the
relation of the distance traveled between two consecutive updates and the radii of ob-
fuscation circles.
If MO moves fast or the update rate is very low, the new MO’s master share can
be located completely outside the previous master share, as depicted in Figure 7. The
condition of having no intersection between two consecutive master shares is:
distance(p0i+1, p
0
i ) > 2 ∗ r0 (16)
In the following, we will only consider sporadic position updates with long time
intervals between updates rather than the continuous tracking of users. Thus, we as-
sume that the time between updates is long enough such that there is no relation be-
tween consecutive updates, which an attacker could exploit. An optimized position
sharing approach focusing on continuous updates using, for instance, dead-reckoning
techniques, has been described by us in [36].
The main idea of our optimized position update algorithm is that under the condi-
tion of Equation 16, we can recalculate and update only the master share while keeping
the refinement shares unchanged.
Now we can estimate the communication costs for the optimized position update
approach. Since only one share has to be updated, the number of sent messages be-
tween MO and LS is NMO−LSopt = 1. In contrast, the basic position update approach
requires all shares to be re-generated and sent, i.e.,Nbasic = n. The resulting reduction
rate of the communication cost is:
RMO−LSopt =
n− 1
n
(17)
Note that sinceNMO−LSopt = 1, our optimized position updated algorithm is always
optimal w.r.t. the cost of communication between MO and LSs.
The pseudocode for the optimized position update approach run by MO is pre-
sented in Algorithm 8. Before sending a location update, the MO determines whether
the optimized approach is applicable by checking the condition of Equation 16 (line 2).
If the condition of Equation 16 is satisfied, only a new master share has to be generated
19
and sent (lines 3-4) to the corresponding LS. The refinement shares s1 . . . sn will re-
main the same without causing any inconsistency during their fusion. This is enabled
by the fact that shares are relative shift vectors, while the absolute coordinates are only
contained in the master share s0. If the condition of Equation 16 is not satisfied, the
basic position update protocol is applied (lines 5-7).
Algorithm 8 Optimized Position Update Algorithm
1: function update shares(~pii, ~pii+1, n, ~s0 . . . ~sn)
2: if distance( ~p0i , ~p0i+1) > 2 ∗ r0 then
3: update shares opt(~pii, ~pii+1, n, ~s0)
4: send(~s0)
5: else
6: ~s0 . . . ~sn ← regenerate all shares( ~pi+1, n, φmin,∆φ)
7: send(~s0 . . . ~sn)
8: end if
6.3. Security of Position Updates
The first privacy requirement corresponding to our problem statement (Equation 14) is
that the position update optimization must not reduce the obfuscation area, i.e., it must
not cause an undesired increase in position precision φk. Regarding this condition,
we can state that the proposed optimized location update algorithm does not reduce
the number of shares, i.e., it does not change the precision level available to authorized
LBAs. In other words, the smaller number of shares sent from MO to LS does not affect
the number of shares provided to LBAs. Therefore, no change of precision occurs.
The second privacy requirement corresponding to our problem statement (Equa-
tion 15) is the probabilistic metric Pk(φk). According to the optimized location update
algorithm, separate location updates only update master shares si0. The remaining re-
finement shares si1 . . . s
i
n and the corresponding refined obfuscation circles remain un-
changed, i.e., the attacker does not get new knowledge. Thus, the randomness of share
generation is preserved by the unchanged share generation algorithms (Algorithm 2,
Algorithm 4), and the probabilities Pk(φk) are the same as in the basic position shar-
ing approaches.
7. Evaluation
Next, we present the evaluation of our share placement algorithm and the optimized
position update algorithm. We start with an evaluation of the share placement runtime
performance, before we compare the probabilistic guarantees of precision levels of
our basic approach with the probabilistic guarantees resulting from optimized share
placement. Then, we evaluate the communication cost of the optimized position update
algorithm.
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Figure 8: (a) Computational cost of genetic share placement algorithm; (b) Improvement of probabilistic
guarantees through placement optimization
7.1. Runtime Performance of Placement Optimization
According to the principle of position sharing, share placement has to be calculated on
the mobile device of the user, since it is the only trusted entity in our system model.
Since mobile devices are typically restricted in terms of processing power and energy,
the runtime of our share placement algorithm is crucial. Therefore, we measured the
runtime of calculating the placement of a set of shares on a state of the art mobile de-
vice (HTC Desire with Android OS, CPU: 1 GHz Qualcomm QSD8250 Snapdragon,
memory: 576 MB RAM). We tested the full number of cycles of the genetic algorithm,
without terminating the algorithm under the “solution found” condition (i.e., we have
tested the worst case scenario, when the solution is not feasible for the given parame-
ters). The number of LSs was given as m = 5; 10; 20, and the number of shares n is in
the interval [m; 50].
Figure 8a shows the average runtime for placing n shares on m LSs. As our eval-
uation shows, the proposed Algorithm 7 has linear complexity and is executed in less
than one second even for larger input parameters (m = 20, n = 50). Therefore, we
conclude that the algorithm is suited also for resource-poor mobile devices.
7.2. Probabilistic Guarantees of Precision Levels after Placement Optimization
Next, we compare the resulting probabilistic guarantees of precision levels of opti-
mized share placement compared to a basic (non-optimized) placement algorithm. We
placed n = 15 shares on m = 5 LSs with heterogeneous risks. The values of risk were
chosen uniform at random from the interval [0; 0.5]: p1 = 0.4932; p2 = 0.3292; p3 =
0.2344; p4 = 0.1788; p5 = 0.0925. The basic algorithm distributes an equal number
of shares (3) to each LS, while the optimized placement placed 1, 2, 2, 3, and 7 shares
onto the given LSs.
Figure 8b depicts the probabilities Pk,attack for the different precision levels φ.
Note that the precision levels φk,attack which correspond to the probability levels
Pk,attack are calculated as the weighted average of position precisions of each possible
k-combination. In Figure 8b, we can see that for the same precision φ, the probabilities
Pk,attack are significantly lower for the most φ values. In other words, the optimized
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Figure 9: Location updates with r0 = 5 m; n = 5
Figure 10: Location updates with n = 5: (a) r0 = 50 m; (b) r0 = 100 m
placement of shares has shifted the peaks of disclosure probability to the left. For
example, for φ = 25 km, Pk,attack = 10.7% for the optimized share placement and
Pk,attack = 40.1% for the uniform share placement.
7.3. Communication Cost after Position Update Optimization
Next, we evaluate the communication overhead of the basic and optimized location
update protocol. As performance metric we use the number of messages sent to LSs
by the different update protocols.
For this evaluation, we used the GeoLife data set [37]. including real trajectories of
periodic trips to work, or hiking and biking trips. From this data set, we have selected
two trips with different update intervals and distances between updates. The first trip
has shorter update intervals (up to 15 s) and distances between updates (tens of meters).
The second trip has longer update intervals (several minutes to more than one hour) and
distances between updates (up to kilometers).
Figure 9 shows the number of update messages sent for each location update (i.e.,
per position change of the trip) by the basic and optimized update protocol, respec-
tively, for short update intervals. The number of shares is n = 5. The radius of the
master share is r0 = 5 m (Figure 9), r0 = 50 m and r0 = 100 m (Figures 10a,10b).
The optimized update approach is often selected in Figure 9 due too small radius of the
master share (generating 6 messages per update), while for a larger radius and shorter
update intervals the basic approach is applied more often (generating 20 messages per
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Figure 11: Saving ratio (reduction of update messages, %) depending on radius r0; n = 5
update). For the given parameters, the basic approach generates 7280 messages in total
for the given 364 position updates. The optimized approach generates 4158 messages
in total (sending 6 messages instead of 20 in 223 out of 364 position updates), which
corresponds to a reduction rate of 42.8%.
Figure 10 shows the number of update messages per location update for the trip
with long update intervals. Again the number of shares is n = 5. In Figure 10a and
Figure 10b, we set r0 = 50 m and r0 = 100 m, respectively. The basic approach
generates 420 messages in total, with 20 messages per each update. The optimized
position update algorithm with 6 messages per update can be selected often since the
distance between the updates is large. The non-optimized updating with 20 messages
per update is selected more often with r0 = 100 due to a larger number of master share
intersections. As a result, the optimized position update algorithm generates 154 for
r0 = 50 and 224 messages in total for r0 = 100 (reduction rate of 63.3% and 46.7%
respectively).
In Figure 11, we show the relative communication overhead of the optimized update
protocol in relation to the basic update protocol for different radii r0. Here, we used
the trip with long update intervals. We can see that a larger r0 usually causes fewer
updates for larger r0. At the same time, for smaller r0 values (for the given mixed data
set: between 0 and 300 m), a smaller r0 leads to fewer intersections and, therefore, to
a smaller number of update messages.
8. Discussion
Finally, we discuss limitations and possible extensions to our approach presented
in this paper.
In this paper, we have only considered sporadic updates of positions rather than
continuous updates. This is a reasonable assumption for many systems based on user
check-ins to locations. Our basic assumption for sporadic updates is that there is no
relation between two consecutive updates. In order for this assumption to hold, there
must be sufficient time between consecutive updates depending on the distance be-
tween updates since otherwise an attacker can exclude some areas from the obfuscated
area to increase the precision of obfuscated positions. In particular, we need to consider
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the so-called Maximum Velocity Attack [38]. This attack limits the obfuscation area
of subsequent updates by assuming a maximum MO speed and distance travelled since
the last update. In order not to be prone to such attacks with our approach, the time
interval between consecutive updates must be long enough such that the user could
travel between both positions at least two times. Otherwise, we need to suppress the
update. This is the well-known counter-measure against such an attack, described in
the literature [38, 39].
It is also possible to consider a probability distribution (pdf) based on the move-
ment correlation instead of one based on intersection of the binary movement boundary.
However, such an approach requires analysis of the trajectory correlation pattern and
is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer to our work [36], which extends the posi-
tion sharing approach by considering trajectory data, and which estimates the resulting
probabilistic privacy guarantees.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we described our position sharing approach, which distributes position
information of a mobile user among multiple location servers of non-trusted providers
in the form of separate position shares. This approach has several interesting proper-
ties like no single point of failure with respect to privacy and graceful degradation of
privacy with the number of compromised location servers.
In this work, we have further improved our basic position sharing approach. The
first extension increases the user’s location privacy if the available location servers
have different trust levels. Based on a probabilistic security metric, we proposed an
approach which improves the user security by selecting the minimal required number
of location servers and by optimizing the distribution of position shares among these
servers. Our solution has linear complexity and in practice can be executed on resource-
poor mobile devices. Our evaluations show that that this optimized share placement
provides a 30%–40% lower probability of a user being discovered by an attacker at the
same precision (privacy) levels.
The second extension of our basic approach is the optimization of the communica-
tion cost caused by position updates. Our calculation of communication cost takes into
account the messages sent from mobile users to location servers as well as the mes-
sages sent from location servers to location-based applications. We have shown that
our position update approach significantly reduces the communication cost achieving
a traffic reduction of up to 60% of the non-optimized protocol version.
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